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Arts Colloquium held under the auspices of the Hegeler Institute, at the
Hegeler-Carus Mansion in La Salle, Illinois, on March 28th–30th, 2003.
The theme of the meeting, “After Modernism and Postmodernism: New
Directions in the Arts” was approached from a variety of disciplinary
angles. The resulting collection is interdisciplinary, with literary theo-
rists, philosophers, music scholars, poets, public intellectuals, and stu-
dio artists articulating their views on the future of the fine arts.
The book is divided into three parts. Part I, “The Future of Art,” is
the most theoretical, with each contributor developing views on the
meaning of modernism and the future of art. The two essays in Part II,
“Progress and Permanence” deal with the problem of progress in art and
the marks of truly progressive art. The final part, “The Prison of Avant-
Gardism,” poses some biting challenges to the view that the avant-garde
opened productive spaces for the future of art. While no essay sings a
song of nostalgia for some lost Golden Age of art, many of the essays do
emphasize that there is much of value to be found in the models of art
offered in the past, and that there is still room for beauty in art. A theme
connecting the essays is a tone of alarm with the way which art has been
“progressing” in our culture.
The following lines from Frederick Turner well capture a sentiment
of the contributors:
It is my contention that our “high” or “academic” or “avant-garde” culture
is in a state of crisis. This crisis is not a healthy one, but a sickness unto
death, a decadence that threatens to destroy our society.1
Turner was the keynote speaker at the La Salle meeting, and in his work
he diagnoses a sickness from which our culture suffers and prescribes
vii
Introduction
Elizabeth Millán
what he calls, “a real cure”—one which “treats our mind and imagina-
tion as well as our behavior.”2 The spirit of Turner’s concern for the cul-
tural crisis confronting our culture inspired the meeting and it inspires
the contributions to this volume.
Most of the contributors are pessimistic about certain paths that art
has taken, but like Turner, express hope about the future for art, as long
as art can break away from a certain obsession with the avant-garde.
Turner speaks in terms of a “new constellation of hope.”3 The essays in
this collection can be said to be part of such a constellation of hope for
the future of art.
viii Introduction
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theory? My rough answer is that evolutionary theory can help to defend
a return to more classical artistic standards and also explain why classi-
cal standards are not simply imposed by social conditioning or by pow-
erful elites, but arise naturally from something more fundamental in the
human constitution.
Classical standards and themes are an expression of our evolutionary
history. The mind can be seen as a biological organ or function, pro-
duced by evolutionary selection pressure. The most arguable and inter-
esting expression of this point of view is that which says that the human
mind is more like a Swiss army knife than a general purpose computer
or sponge for information. Our minds are modular. First propounded by
Jerry Fodor, the idea was taken up by evolutionary psychologists and
fleshed out with a history. Evolution has given us cognitive modules,
partly self-contained mental “machines” that are attuned to solving
problems within a narrowly defined domain. Darwinian evolution has
shaped our minds in particular ways that fundamentally affect our eval-
uation of everything we perceive and therefore our appreciation of art.
What are the implications of seeing our minds from this evolution-
ary modular point of view for a return to classical standards, or at least
for an escape from the excesses of the avant-garde? My provocative con-
jecture is that the standards and themes of classic art better satisfy the
relevant cognitive modules and their disposition for active use to an
inbuilt excellence than does much of the avant-garde. Beauty is the pat-
terns that our ancestors had to detect in the pursuit of opportunities and
the avoidance of dangers and the incidental properties of the relevant
cognitive modules. Any module that evolved would also likely have a
taste for excellence or virtuosity, for its exercise and full engagement.
Two corollaries of an evolutionary perspective are that we may not avoid
109
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110 Ray Scott Percival
elitism in the arts or varied tastes (even between the sexes), and that,
although classical standards are a good proxy for our native aesthetics,
our native standards may be fragmentary across types of art, thereby
undermining the classical call for universality. In an attempt to under-
stand the nature of our cognitive modules, and therefore our native aes-
thetic, I tentatively analyse them in terms of a conjecture-and-refutation
model of knowledge growth, arguing that they are crystalized conjec-
tures about conjectures. I also analyze Stephen Kaplan’s work on aes-
thetic preferences for landscapes in these terms in an attempt to make
clearer what his categories of complexity, coherence, legibility and mys-
tery are, thereby enabling me to generalize the application of his work
to other arts.
By classical standards I mean those we associate with ancient Greece
and Rome, and also with the revival of those standards in Renaissance
Italy and France. This is a broad brush stroke, I grant. There are sub-
stantial differences between ancient Greece and ancient Rome and it can
be argued that the Renaissance Italians, though trying to copy what they
only dimly understood to be ancient standards, went far beyond them,
creating (or discovering) new standards. I do not intend to belittle the
achievements of other civilizations such as ancient Egypt, India, China
or Japan. Indeed, if one takes the classical standards of harmony,
restraint, accuracy, coherence and concord at an abstract level, one can
see these (or at least strong hints of them) in all the arts of antiquity, even
back to Paleolithic art.
I want to suggest that of all such artistic flowerings, classical art stan-
dards best approximated our native aesthetics. There are strong hints that
classical western art shared the same latent standards with non-western
artists, in the fact that western techniques such as perspective were rap-
idly accepted by them once they saw them, in the same way that anthro-
pologists have found that tribes isolated from industrial society will
readily adopt modern tools, such as knives and axes, as soon as they see
them. The archetypically Japanese artist Hokusai adopted perspective as
soon as he learned of its existence (without losing his Japanese syle).1
On the other hand, much avant-garde art is a substantial mismatch to our
native aesthetics. But I think that our native aesthetics can be seen in all
periods and cultures, and—if glossed as classical—even surfaces where
one might least suspect. Even the so-called avant-garde is not altogether
innocent of a deference to them.2
However, the avant-garde (which I take to include modernism and
post-modernism) has exhausted itself.3 Initiated by Cézanne in painting
and then rapidly imitated by the other arts, modernism was at least, if not
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an aesthetic, then an intellectual adventure, in self-criticism. As Clement
Greenberg put it:
The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of the characteristic
methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself—not in order to sub-
vert it, but to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence. (Art and
Literature 4, Spring 1965, 193–201)
Greenberg argues that Modernism had its source in Kant. Kant used
logic to show the limits of logic, but thereby entrenched it more securely
in its better-defined home ground. By analogy, modern art used the
methods of each art to show their limits, but thereby confirmed its own
domain. For example, painting strove to distinguish itself from sculpture
and emphasise the flatness of its medium. A significant amount of
avant-garde art is a genuine attempt at self-criticism and the exploration
of the medium and standards and techniques handed down.4 And just
because an aesthetic is genetic, it does not follow that it is manifest and
easily satisfied: it may require a great deal of learning and experimenta-
tion to both execute and to appreciate.
But there were other non-artistic forces at work in the growth of the
avant-garde. Driven by the historicist conception of progress (the
obsession with anticipating and divining the next stage of artistic cre-
ation), and the self-marketing power of the novel work, artists produced
more and more novel, shocking, controversial works. Stretching the
notion of what counts as art beyond the elastic limit of logic, the avant-
garde has branched out to a number of withering twigs: nihilism, polit-
ical or social activism, and a disguised pluralism. The ideology behind
some modern art is a limp nihilism: anything goes. Michelangelo’s
David and the bust of Nefertiti are seen as equivalent (just a point of
view) to a pile of bricks and Leonardo’s Mona Lisa to daubs of paint on
a Diesel T-shirt. Other art is simply or mainly a Trojan horse or “fire-
work display” to get your political or social message across. Another
branch of art is the disguised pluralism that is advertised as a call for
the liberation of artistic creation, but has an authoritarian shriek: aes-
thetic discrimination, except when motivated by the “correct” political
perspective is, within many circles, seen as authoritarian and elitist. The
rise of relativism within the humanities has offered encouragement and
defenses for these developments.
This paper assumes a defiantly absolutist position with regard to
the existence of evolutionary aesthetic standards. But it is also equally
aggressive in the defense of an experimental pluralism in attempts to
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112 Ray Scott Percival
discover those standards. We can learn from the methodology of sci-
ence that the existence of competing conjectures does not mean that
we live in different worlds, but that this is the best way to get closer to
the truth. Similarly, the existence of different and competing standards
in art does not mean that there is no objective reality to our aesthetics
against which these postulated standards could clash. And even if 
there are genetic standards, this still leaves open room for individual
variation.
Great art, that which tends to be accorded highest status across cul-
tures—if only it has been discovered—has a three-fold character: skill,
form and meaning. Different types or examples of art will embody dif-
ferent amounts or emphases on the three aspects. The lesser arts of dec-
oration (wallpaper, mosaics, T-shirts, ambient music, and so forth),
having an almost exclusive concern with form, are valuable, but do not
constitute high art or grand art. The difference between high art and low
art is like the difference between a cheese sandwich and a three course
meal at a sophisticated restaurant. One does not always want the grand
meal—the sandwich will often suffice, but the grand meal is clearly
superior to the cheese sandwich. The grand meal satisfies more aspects
of our interest in eating: the meaning and mood of the place, the various
aspects of our taste (savoury, sweet, and so forth). At one time opera was
the grand aesthetic meal, now I think that movies have taken this role.
Computer games have the potential to take over here, with their great
capacity for a totally immersive experience in which many central and
peripheral mental modules are fully engaged.
1. Darwinian Evolution
One could argue that a theory of universal aesthetics does not need to
postulate an evolutionary origin for this. For example, one could simply
explore the neurological basis of it and how it is expressed in different
cultures. However, I assume that one can better understand something
from the way it was produced. Because I am arguing that our aesthetics
are an expression of our evolutionary history, as Palaeolithic hunter
gatherers (and even before), I ought to make clear what I assume to be
the dominant evolutionary view: Darwinian theory. By dominant I mean
that it is the best explanation available.
Darwin proposed that all the great variety and form of life on earth
could be explained by the action of three fundamental processes on a
common ancestor over many millennia. Design was not necessary.
These processes are:
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1. Natural variation (the progeny of an organism are similar to but
different from one another and their parents, and this variation
occurs spontaneously and independently of the environment and
the action of the organism);
2. Natural selection (the environment eliminates the relatively unfit,
those variants less productive of self-reproducing off-spring); and
3. The inheritance of variations (selected variants are copied with
errors).
There are various elaborations of this, for example, gradualism
(which assumes a steady accumulation of slight variations) versus salta-
tionism (which assumes periods of more rapid change), and species ver-
sus group selection, but the three-process schema is accepted by all
variations.5
2. The Evolutionary Psychology of Art: Interpreting 
the Claim for Universal Aesthetics
There are standards and themes of art that appeal to native dispositions
that have evolved either as a direct adaptive response to an ancient evo-
lutionary pressure to survive and reproduce or are a by-product of such
direct adaptation. Any organ that evolves will have directly adaptive
properties, but it will also have incidental properties. Some of these may,
in their turn, be adaptive for some other reason (for example, a dog’s
ability to swim may be incidental to its attempts to walk when in water
and not to its ancestors having adapted to swimming), while other inci-
dental properties may have no adaptive function at all (such as the
human mind’s ability to understand abstract mathematics). Some of our
innate art standards may be of this nature.
What is the evidence for our standards of art being a reflection of
evolutionary pressure? Well, one’s first thought would be that if these
standards were indeed genetic, then they would be evident across all cul-
tures and historical periods. Such a finding would not be surprising in
the light of Donald Brown’s book, Human Universals (1991), which is a
carefully assembled account of traits found in all cultures. The list con-
tains hundreds of items, including body adornment, music, dance,
romantic poetry, mourning the dead, exchange of goods, food taboos.
Child psychologists no longer argue for the blank-slate view of the
human infant: the infant is already equipped with assumptions and pref-
erences about the world that govern its perception and behaviour with
AD
VA
NC
E C
OP
Y
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D P
RO
OF
  
114 Ray Scott Percival
respect to people, objects and tools.6 Charles Murray has also compiled
a survey of great achievers in both the arts and sciences from 800 B.C.
to 1950. He found a surprising degree of consensus across cultures
about the rank ordering of artists, with Shakespeare, Michelangelo,
Mozart, and Beethoven coming at the top of people’s assessments. Faced
by such diverse evidence of cultural universals, it does not seem far-
fetched to entertain the hypothesis of a universal aesthetic. I mention
these findings not because they establish a universal aesthetic by them-
selves, but just to indicate the tide of evidence that the cultural relativist
has to face when arguing against my thesis: it is no longer sufficient to
simply point to cultural variation to undermine the idea of a universal
propensity. We have to be a bit more subtle here. Being general, stan-
dards and themes can allow for much cultural and historical variation. I
conjecture that our native aesthetic was most clearly expressed during
certain periods of Ancient Greece and Rome, but especially during the
Renaissance. But at least some of these standards may be found (or at
least hinted at) in many periods and civilisations, ancient Egyptian,
Indian, and Minoan, for example.
There are two points to be made here. First, there are, when one
looks more carefully, fundamental “atomistic” standards. An example of
an atomistic standard would be the golden ratio7 in architecture.
Secondly, native tastes need not be manifestly obvious to those who have
them. They may become apparent only after much exploratory trial and
error and the development of both the refined skill and technology that
can create the requisite object of art. Also, they may be used even though
there is no explicit formulation of the standard, as perhaps happened
with the golden ratio. It has been suggested that the Parthenon and the
Acropolis both incorporated the golden ratio. One criticism has it that
even though the Greeks knew of the golden ratio in their mathematics,
there is no evidence that they explicitly applied it to the design of these
buildings. However, my thesis does not require an explicit formulation
or application of the golden ratio as a standard in order for it to count as
one tacitly discovered and accepted as a result of hundreds of years of
building practise. There is a creative leap between knowing a theory or
definition in one domain and explicitly applying it to another domain.
My main point is that, counterintuitively, the expression of these stan-
dards have a certain cultural and historical fragility. They need to be dis-
covered and once discovered by a civilisation they may be lost with the
demise of that civilisation, as happened with the fall of Ancient Greece
and Rome. We may be witnessing the loss of classical standards in our
own time. I want to qualify the status I have accorded classical art. It
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may be the best approximation to our native aesthetics. It is therefore a
good proxy to our native standards. But it is not the last word on what
constitutes our native standards: it is simply a good short-hand for refer-
ring to standards that we are still exploring. I think we have to leave
room for other themes and standards to be discovered and their satisfac-
tion elaborated and refined. For example, it is arguable that the themes
of mystery, horror and the sublime may be native themes that the classi-
cal world did not fully develop, leaving it to the romantic movement in
painting and literature to embody elaborations of the mysterious and
horrific,8 and gothic architecture to embody the sublime. It is clear that
mystery and horror have a genuine enthusiastic audience in contempo-
rary movies and literature, if not in some post-modern painting.
3. The Modularity of Mind Hypothesis
I am arguing that psychology is the mediator of our evolutionary aes-
thetics, so I need the most persuasive psychological theory. It will
become clear that the most powerful psychological theories reinforce 
the difficulty for the cultural relativist in arguing against a universal 
aesthetics. 
The main ally of the evolutionary approach in psychology has been
cognitive psychology, which effectively refuted and has supplanted the
behaviorism of J.B. Watson and B.F. Skinner9. The most spectacular
event here was Chomsky’s devastating review of Skinner’s Verbal
Behaviour.10 Behaviorism was the last hold out in psychology of the
over-socialized conception of human beings, the so-called blank slate
view of the human mind. The blank slate perspective is now in retreat,
with a few hold-outs in Humanities and Literature departments.
A guiding principle of cognitive psychology from the beginning has
been that the mind can be understood as a general purpose computer:
Perception, thinking, and acting are a matter of procuring, processing
and storing information. One of the most interesting developments in
cognitive psychology, which has accelerated debate in evolutionary psy-
chology is the theory that our minds are not general purpose computers,
but are fragmented into a number of modules, specific purpose mental
“machines” attuned to solving problems in a limited domain.
Jerry Fodor conjectured that the mind should be split into periph-
eral input and output modules, a set of sense-specific modules and
motor-specific output modules. The main reason for suggesting that
the mind uses modules rather than a general purpose computer is that
the problems the organism solves are so-called “ill posed”, the data of
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perception are insufficient to define a solution: specific assumptions
about each domain are required.11
But there is also a central cognition, the part of the mind that takes
output from perception and solves general problems, uses inferences,
analogy and metaphor and creates new thought. This is not modular.
There are input modules for vision, audition, face recognition and lan-
guage. Each module is: 
a. Innately-specified,
b. Mandatory (when you open your eyes, you cannot help but see an
environment that is placed before you),
c. Swift in operation (seeing the environment is experienced as
instantaneous),
d. Encapsulated (what you see is not influenced by what you hear or
touch and vice versa. Also, what we know has little effect on our
perception; for example, visual illusions persist even when we
know they are illusions.),12
e. Delivering shallow or non-conceptual outputs (In the case of
vision, producing a 21/2 D “sketch”.) 
f. Associated with specific neural systems, (g) liable to specific
patterns of break down, (h) develop according to a specific
sequence.
In our ancestral environment it paid in many circumstances to be able to
perceive and act rapidly to opportunities and dangers. In other circum-
stances, it paid to be able to think more strategically and with greater
reflection and creativity. Fodor’s conjecture is that evolution equipped us
with perception modules that are perfectly suited to rapid action, and
also with a general purpose intelligence that is more suited to the more
reflective phases of adaptation. Fodor’s view can be called peripheral-
systems modularity.
Since Fodor’s book there has been a flurry of various versions of
modularity. At the other extreme to Fodor are a number of positions that
argue for massive modularity, that even central cognition is a set of mod-
ular systems.13 On this view, there is little learning; most of our ability
to think about the world is already hard-wired into us. In between these
two views lies a moderately modular view, that there are both peripheral
and central modular processes, but there is still room for general pur-
pose thought and creativity.14
What all these modular views have in common is the assumption that
the mind is not designed from scratch with the goal of adaptation to an
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exhaustive and distinct specification of a set of current demands. The
various modules have evolved piece-meal in an ad hoc manner, building
on structures and functions that existed before, adapting to circum-
stances that in many cases do not exist today. Darwin referred to this
phenomenon as pre-adaptation. A good example is the evolution of
insect wings from organs that originally served only as heat-exchangers,
keeping the insect cool in the heat and warm in the cold. Research has
shown that there is a range of wing sizes that can serve both functions.
There is a TV program called “Scrap Heap Challenge,” in which con-
testants are charged with the goal of building something from what they
can find in a scrap heap. They may have to construct, for example, an
amphibious car. They can only use what is to hand in the scrap yard. This
is similar to the way evolution has to work. The main differences are that
whereas the contestants can look ahead to see how best to put the parts
together (for immediate use and for possible changes of function later),
evolution charges ahead blindly producing something rather clunky and
perhaps also difficult to alter later for a changed use.15 So we can expect
that the modules for our hearing and seeing and touch are quite differ-
ent from one another.
What does this mean for the standards of classic art? I think it means
that there may be no standards or themes or aspects of form that are
applicable across all types of art. Any universal art standards can come
only from the central cognitive systems and is confined to the area of
meaning and the skill of execution.
4. The Modular Fragmentation of Standards 
Across the Arts
There is a puzzle here from the point of view of combining classicism
with evolutionary theory. The modular view would suggest that there are
no classic standards that apply across the arts, only within each one and
across cultures and times. Even though the standards may all be pro-
duced by the same mechanism, we have seen that the ad hoc and piece-
meal nature of evolution means that the relevant modular systems for
each art may be very different. This becomes more plausible when we
recall that the relevant modular properties may be purely incidental. One
might wish to hazard the guess that if classic art is a reflection of
evolved dispositions, then there are classic standards to each art, but no
standards that pertain to all types of art. On the modular view it is tempt-
ing to conjecture that each art has its fascination with the forms appro-
priate to its perceptual field (as Greenberg emphasized), and that the
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aspects of form, standards, and themes for each art are constrained by
the characteristics of the modules responsible for processing that sense
channel or domain.
We should expect to find some standards that are specific to each
peripheral sensory module, but that what pertains to all arts is largely
imposed by our more fluid, creative, and conjectural central cognition.
Another source of cross-art standards is the value of skill. Charles
Murray has noted the universal desire for the exercise of and attainment
of excellence in a skill. This is to be expected on an evolutionary view
of human beings. Any cognitive module that evolved to process a par-
ticular domain of problems would also likely have a “taste” for its acti-
vation and engagement to the full. Any variant module with a
half-hearted interested in its function would likely be eliminated in
favour of other more dedicated variant modules.
Classic art is well-known for its veneration of clear, coherent form.
The configuration of parts in a building is just as important as the con-
figuration of parts in a painting or sculpture, emphasized by Clive Bell
in his theory of “significant form” as the only aesthetically relevant
aspect of a work. The standard of clarity is probably as basic as the
pleasure someone with poor sight gets in wearing their first pair of well-
designed glasses. Being able to perceive clearly an environment (real,
simulated or imagined) is a product of the fact that our cognitive mod-
ules actively seek and prefer clear input to work on. By clarity here I
mean information that would enable us to form a single stable interpre-
tation. There probably is some pleasure in making clear what is initially
unclear. We take some pleasure in resolving an ambiguous illusion, such
as the beautiful lady and hag, and also in the autostereogram.16 But the
goal of the relevant visual module in these cases is still clarity and not
an impasse of unresolved obscurity. At the level of form, much avant
garde art does not allow such resolutions. Our ancestors had to make
quick decisions such as “Is that a pattern of moonlight on the bush or is
it a sabre-tooth?” The classical standard of coherent form, where the
boundaries and integrity of objects presented are evident, likely derives
from a similar ancestral demand of adaptation. It is extremely useful to
be able to discern objects and their environment. There are significant
odd exceptions to the stricture of coherence in mosaics from Antioch
and Ancient Rome. The Ancients were keen on trompe l’oeil, in which
there is no one coherent interpretation of the three-dimensional shapes
suggested by the mosaic, rudimentary forerunners of Escher’s visually
amusing and clever depictions of impossible environments. However,
these constructions still strongly hint at coherent objects and can be seen
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as a play around the standards imposed by our visual modules. They are
at least coherently incoherent. One can easily imagine how, through too
great a neglect of coherence (a non-systematic neglect), the work would
be spoiled. Our visual module gives us pleasure in resolving a coherent
interpretation, and these works continually prompt repeated resolutions,
squeezing every last drop of processing pleasure out of our visual mod-
ule. Work on the visual system by Marr and Beiderman indicates that the
visual module solves its specific problems by searching for definite sim-
ple cues in the environment such as edges, various idealised curved
shapes, called geons, and symmetry. Having analyzed the environment
into such components, it synthesizes a perception. From a two-dimen-
sional array of photon impacts on the retina, the module constructs a
perception of a three-dimensional world in the form of a model that can
be examined and experimented with in the way that computer models of
cities can be used. The module uses these cues because they are signs (or
have been signs) of evolutionarily significant things in the world, such
as objects distinct from the background, moving organisms (which are
symmetrical) and obstacles to movement. If the scene has little coher-
ence the visual system is given extra, possibly unsolvable, work to do.
Work on preference for different types of landscape by Stephen
Kaplan helps to elaborate my rough conjectures about classical art being
a good proxy for our native aesthetics. Kaplan conjectured that humans
are knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using organisms, and he con-
ducted research into landscapes that allow different levels of exploration
and information gathering.
For many years the dominant view in cognitive studies of aesthetics
was that the best art contained an optimal amount or complexity of
information. Too little information makes for a drab work; too much
information makes for an overly busy work. Kaplan’s work suggests that
a better understanding of the aesthetics of landscapes is in terms of a 2
× 2 matrix.
Classes of Information Understanding Exploration 
Immediate Coherence Complexity 
Inferred Legibility Mystery 
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The pairs “Understanding and Exploration” and “Immediate and
Inferred” are supposed to represent classes of information. The first cov-
ers the human need for understanding and exploration; the second con-
cerns how much time it takes to process the information from the scene.
Kaplan’s general point is that safe and useful movement through a
landscape requires a great deal of skill and knowledge, and that land-
scapes that aid exploration, way-finding, and information processing
would be preferred over those that impede these needs. Preferred land-
scapes contain moderate degrees of complexity, coherence, and semi-
open spatial arrangement. Preferred landscapes also contained a degree
of what Kaplans calls “mystery”—indications that more interesting
information could be obtained with further exploration (such as roads or
paths that bend round hills, entering woods, partially blocked views).
Preferred landscapes also contain high levels of “legibility”, indications
that one could easily maintain one’s orientation and find one’s way both
into and out of the scene, extending one’s cognitive map of the environ-
ment (it looks like one could learn it). Looking into murky environments
in deep sea diving or in a fog or dense forest is relatively unpleasant, and
the avoidance of such environments has had evolutionary advantages.
I want to suggest that if there are cross-art genetic classical stan-
dards, Kaplan’s work is most likely the best way of teasing them out into
the open. Kaplan’s work is a way to delineate the formal qualities
stressed by classicism. The highly predictive variables of coherence and
complexity seem to have an affinity with the formal qualities of har-
mony, clarity, and restraint. Legibility and mystery may be ways in
which other more meaningful (and conjectural) qualities of a scene can
be used to extend and refine our conception of native standards, not only
for the visual arts but for all the arts. Mystery is perhaps a post-classi-
cal discovery about our native aesthetic.
One can see how to apply these criteria to contrast classical and
avant-garde art. Classical art appears to have significant amounts of
these qualities; avant-garde art often does not. At the cost of some clar-
ity, impressionism seems to have gained a degree of mystery, complex-
ity and legibility; abstract visual art seems to have very little mystery
(partly because of the obsession with the flatness of the medium),
though it seems to have retained some coherence. The best examples
would be from minimalist artists such as Kasimir Malevich (“Black
Square on a White Ground”) and later artists such as Ad Reinhart
(“Black Painting,” 1973, which consists of a very dark grey cross on a
black ground) and Barnet Newman (“Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow and
Blue III,” 1966–67, which consists of a large rectangular expanse of
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deep red bounded on the left side by a thin strip of yellow and on the
right by a thicker strip of dark blue.)17 They successfully eliminated both
meaning and even indications of the personal and skill in an effort to
present form. But in their attempt to eliminate the representational and
other meaning, they produced works that lack complexity and mystery,
and therefore any enduring interest apart from their curiosity value for
the public and their interest for a minority of artistic and intellectual
connoisseurs. My point is that Kaplan’s work explains why these paint-
ings will never attain mass appeal to the public.
A similar point can be made about such musical compositions as
John Cage’s “Four Minutes, Thirty-Three Seconds” of silence. From the
point of view of our native aesthetics, the best one can say about this is
that it is intellectually intriguing. It clearly lacks complexity, mystery,
and legibility. It is not clear that it lacks coherence, but this is because it
has no parts that can be coherent.
Can an object that is perceptually homogenous be a work of art? I
want to suggest that it cannot be because it fails to have complexity and
coherence. I want to suggest that if a supposed work of art cannot be
forged in part, then it is not a work of art. A work of art needs to have
parts that are recognizably part of the work and of no other object. It
needs to be “Incrementally recognisable.” Any classical work meets this
criterion, but many avant-garde pieces fail. British composer Mike Batt
found himself in a legal battle over a composition called “One Minute
of Silence” that appeared on an album by his band, The Planets. The
defense lawyer had a field day, asking the prosecution to identify which
particular one minute of silence out of Cages’s 4’ 33” the group was sup-
posedly plagiarising. The same point could be applied to overly abstract
paintings and ready-mades (such as Warhol’s Brillo Boxes).
The interesting question here is: do these formal qualities extend
over to the other arts? Music seems to have analogous formal qualities
of coherence, complexity, legibility and mystery. But there are no equiv-
alent aspects for the tactile, olfactory and kinaesthetic senses. Music is
especially interesting. We have well-established classical pieces of
music that have no representational or symbolic qualities, but that are
delightful and moving sequences of sound. But we have no equivalent
for the sense of light. We have no delightful and moving works of light
lacking any representational or symbolic quality. The closest candidates
here are firework displays and Kaleidoscopes. But these seem pale ana-
logues (and one can hardly imagine going to see the same firework dis-
play many times over as one repeatedly listens to a work by Bach) and
they do not share all of the important variables that Kaplan has isolated.
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Similarly, we have no orchestrated sequence of aromas or touches.
Massage is aimed not at a disinterested appreciation but at certain bod-
ily states of relaxation or therapy. But if classical standards apply across
the arts, that is what one would expect. The answer is that the peculiari-
ties of the relevant modules of each sense makes for distinctive stan-
dards for the associated art. Another intriguing possibility is that these
arts are waiting to be developed. However, I suspect that aromatic art
would remain purely decorative and simple and, when most complex,
purely supportive of some other art, because there are no plausible com-
plex changes of aroma of evolutionary significance that such an art
could tap into. Perhaps the cross-modal standards we think we see are
imposed by our central cognitive systems by our ability to ratchet up the
level of abstractness through language.
Classic art not only satisfies the formal pleasures afforded by our
perceptual modules, but also satisfies our central cognition because it is
rich in meaning and engages our pleasure in interpreting objects in
terms of representation, metaphor and analogy. Although still sharing an
interest in form with classic art, much avant-garde art lost interest in
imbuing art with meaning. Much of that which did retain meaning
adopted an obscure style, a typical tactic when one has little to say, a ten-
dency noted and scorned by Tolstoy. There is a strong suggestion that
what we take to be art in general may actually be many disparate inde-
pendent domains of intrinsically pleasurable creative activity in the
same way that Wittgenstein suggested that games form family resem-
blances, but do not form a set definable in terms of a set of necessary
and sufficient conditions.
What role does meaning have in our larger conception of standards?
I think that our more abstract conception of art almost compels us to see
uniform themes and standards across the arts, and that these more freely
created conceptions may come into conflict with our native tastes.
The eternal conflict between our crystallized formal modules and
our fluid imaginative cognition meaning is hardly separable from works
of art, but nevertheless it can be discerned as another aspect of art and
different from form or the execution of skill. Form is the perceptible
arrangement of the physical parts of a work of art; the meaning is the
interpretation that is attached to it. With proper training one can learn to
appreciate the form alone of a work of art. This is the truth in Clive
Bell’s theory. Still, much great art has both form and meaning. Arthur
Danto has stressed the importance of interpretation. Puzzled by Andy
Warhol’s Brillo Boxes, Danto argued that anything can be art given the
right theory and situation. These theories or interpretations exist as the
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historically variable background to presentations of works in galleries,
thus explaining why Warhol’s Brillo Boxes would not be accepted in dif-
ferent eras such as classical Greece or Renaissance Italy. It is not so
much that Socrates or Leonardo would dislike Brillo Boxes: they simply
would not understand what was going on if they had been presented in
a situation normally interpreted as a place for art. I resist this over
socialized, over-historicised conception of the role of meaning in art.
The outstanding ability of the human mind is to create radically new
things: new theories, new technologies, new methods—new ways of
looking at and coping with the world. We are not simply a set of hard-
wired modules, but creators. But at the same time we cannot ignore the
promptings of our genetic dispositions. We have the ability to imagine
being radically different from what we in fact are. We can imagine hav-
ing very different wants and tastes from those we do have. We can also
formulate in language these fancied sets of wants as the latest fashion or
ideology, what all humans should aspire to. We can thus go to a gallery
to look at Warhol’s Brillo Boxes or listen to a performance of a piece by
Stockhausen,18 and pretend that we are engaged and satisfied. We are
not deeply moved, as we can be by classical art, but simply intellectually
intrigued by these adventures and sometimes awed or impressed by their
skilful execution (Stockhausen’s pieces can require exceptional musi-
cianship and Warhol’s Brillo Boxes were an example of good carpentry).
But at the same time the public’s taste for the less ideologically moti-
vated (or simply intriguing) can be expected to assert itself, rejecting
these proposed tastes as only superficially satisfying.
Still, this tussle between ideological or fashionable theories and our
genetic delicacies will always be active. This is partly because our abil-
ity to produce complex theories with which we interpret our experience
is almost boundless. Art that relies on embodying or transmitting an
interesting “interpretation” is here to stay. The human mind cannot help
but see meaning in the world, even if there is none there. This does not
conflict with Bell’s point about form, as he is talking about the focus of
one’s attention, say on the form of the Mona Lisa and not on the fact that
it represents the Mona Lisa.19 Seeing meaning and making guesses
about what is happening in the world about us is as continual and
mandatory as our breathing lungs and beating heart. An organism that
does not continually produce and check hypotheses about its world
would be rapidly eliminated in favour of its more alert competitors.
This perspective is consonant with discoveries in neuroscience and
with the logic of scientific methodology. Neuroscientists have discov-
ered that the brain does not require continuous stimulation to be
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active: it is spontaneously active, even down to the level of individual
peripheral sensory nerves. For example, our retinal nerves, cones and
rods, are spontaneously active and the process of seeing an object
begins when this activity is modified (in some respects inhibited) by
incoming light, not simply by a pattern of cones being switched on by
a correlative pattern of photons.
Concluding Remarks
I want to distance myself from an overly reductionist perspective. I find
it fascinating that the universe is truly creative. New properties and
structures emerge in the course of the evolution of the cosmos. Biology
and human beings themselves are prime examples of the emergence of
radically new things that have their own lawful organization. Language
and art are relatively recent examples of this phenomenon.
Are there classical values that cannot be reduced to evolutionary the-
ory? Works of art may be produced by our evolutionary leanings and
judged by a perceived degree of matching with genetic preferences. But
once created they may present other problems whose solution is not
wholly governed by (determined by) our evolutionary dispositions. Also,
creating a standard is—though bounded by, made possible by, and
encouraged by an evolutionary process—non-deterministic. And once
created it too can have a life of its own, which is especially clear when
it assumes the form of a linguistic formulation. Consider the Cubists’s
standard of the priority of the surface and form in a painting. This cre-
ates a problem, for the Cubists intuitively understood the mandatory
nature of representational viewing: people could hardly help themselves
search for representations. As Ernest Gombrich suggests, the Cubists’
solution was to break up and distort the objects so that no one coherent
representational interpretation could be formed, thus forcing the viewer
to concentrate on the surface of the canvas. Whether their work satisfied
or matched our genetic proclivities for form is another matter. The point
is that some standards, both classical and avant-garde, will have this free
conjectural and independent quality that is not determined by our genes.
On the other hand, they can be tested by our genetic propensities.
Does evolutionary theory exclude elitism in the arts? It is argued,
powerfully by Frederick Turner (1995), that the rise of the avant-garde,
with its requirements of “deep interpretation,” has spawned an elite class
of academic interpreters, who are called on to explain to the public just
what clothes the emperor is wearing today. One of the attractive things
about the appeal to evolutionary theory is that it appears to reassert the
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innocence of artistic appreciation by showing it to be a universal human
need or preference, the kind of art that Tolstoy (1898) esteemed. That it
is not simply a sign of acquiescence in the peculiar tastes of a power elite
or the requirements of a particular social structure. As we have seen, in
Darwin’s theory of evolution, there are two fundamental processes: the
production of natural variation and the elimination of relatively unfit
variations. In each generation, there is always variation. For example, in
humans there are always both dwarfs and giants and variation between
these extremes. The variation often closely approximates the form of a
normal distribution (bell-shaped), a relatively small number of extreme
variants with the great majority clustering around the mean. But there is
always the presence of extremes. This is true of all characteristics.
Now, if artistic appreciation is an evolutionary product, then you
might expect to see variants, just as you see variants in body size, ath-
letic prowess, memory, scientific achievement, or other characteristics.
Perhaps some forms of art can only be fully appreciated by a small num-
ber of genetic mutants, just as some areas of mathematics require a rare
ability to handle abstractions. The natural variations here might be in
either or both the ability to handle the abstract intricacies or the taste
(preference) for such qualities. If this is admitted, then the return to clas-
sical standards may not be popular in all respects.
 
AD
V
UN
CO
RR6. Does the New Classicism Need Evolutionary Theory?
1. Japanese artists, prior to learning of the techniques of perspective, used occlu-
sion, shading and other hints at depth.
2. For example, Matisse admired the Greeks for their virtues of serenity and har-
mony. This is clear in his discussion of the Greeks’ disdain for the literal representation
of movement: “The Greeks too are calm; a man hurling a discus will be shown in the
moment in which he gathers his strength before the effort or else, if he is shown in the
most violent and precarious position implied by his action, the sculptor will have
abridged and condensed it so that balance is re-established, thereby suggesting a feeling
of duration” (“Notes d’un peintre,” La Grande Revue, Paris, 25th December 1908).
3. One exception here might be magical realism and other literary genres. Literary
fiction, despite George Polti’s suggestion that there are only thirty-six dramatic situations,
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is boundless because of its ability to represent the human being’s boundless imagination.
It is unfettered by the need to satisfy the formal demands of the perceptual modules.
4. An important exception here is Dada, which rejected logic and formal, system-
atic approaches in response to the horrors of the First World War and the Dadaists’ belief
that the war was the result of the systematic industrialization of the world. “In art, Dada
reduces everything to an initial simplicity, growing always more relative. It mingles its
caprices with the chaotic wind of creation and the barbaric dances of savage tribes. It
wants logic reduced to a personal minimum, while literature in its view should be pri-
marily intended for the individual who makes it.” Tristan Tzara, Dada Manifesto, 1918.
5. The ramifications of Darwin’s revolution are still being worked out. First, obvi-
ously, within biology. But the three-process schema is so powerful and general that it can
be applied outside biology. It was seen that the units undergoing natural variation, selec-
tion and inheritance need not be biological. As long as they could undergo these
processes, in a sufficiently stable domain, one could have an interesting evolution pro-
ductive of new structures and functions. Among writers who have argued that the
Darwinian principles of natural selection apply not simply to biology but also to mental,
epistemological, moral, social or even cosmic evolution, are Walter Bagehot, Physics
and Politics: Or, Thoughts on the Application of ‘Natural Selection’ and ‘Inheritance’ to
Political Society, London: Henry King, 1872; William James, “Great Men, Great
Thoughts, and the Environment,” Atlantic Monthly, 1880; David G. Ritchie, Darwinism
and Politics, Swan Sonnenschein, 1890; Samuel Alexander, “Natural Selection in
Morals,” International Journal of Ethics 2:4, 409–439; Charles Sanders Peirce,
Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge Conference Lectures of 1898,
Harvard University Press, 1992; Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An
Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions, Macmillan, 1899, and The Place of
Science in Modern Civilization and Other Essays, New York: Huebsch, 1919; and J.M.
Baldwin, Darwin and the Humanities, Baltimore: Review Publishing, 1909. They
argued that Darwinism had a wider application than to biology alone. Evolutionary
thinking has been applied to the psychology of learning, perception (Gregory) and think-
ing; philosophy of science (Popper); micro-economics (for example Richard Nelson and
Sidney Winter applied the principles of variation, inheritance and selection to routines
in firms in An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Harvard University Press,
1982.); computer science, and many other problem areas. The great polymath Donald
Campbell suggested that Darwinism contained a general theory of the evolution of all
complex systems. Campbell made the point that the appropriate analogy for social evo-
lution is not biotic evolution, but the more general processes of evolution of complex
systems “for which organic evolution is but one instance” (“Variation, Selection, and
Retention in Sociocultural Evolution,” 1965, reprinted in General Systems 14, 1969.
Richard Dawkins introduced the term “Universal Darwinism” to connote this perspec-
tive: “Universal Darwinism,” in D.S. Bendall, ed., Evolution from Molecules to Man,
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
6. S. Baron-Cohen, Mind-Blindness: An Essay on Autism and the Theory of Mind,
MIT Press, 1995; E. Spelke, “Initial Knowledge: Six Suggestions,” Cognition 50, 1995).
7. Two quantities are said to be in the golden ratio, if “the whole (the sum of the two
parts) is to the larger part as the larger part is to the smaller part.” That is if , where a is
the larger part and b is the smaller part.
8. The Ancient Greeks had horror in their stories, but it was only the romantics who
made horror the main point of a story.
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9. Even Skinner made many references to the evolutionary perspective and thought
that an organism’s susceptibility to reinforcement schedules was a product of evolution.
In other words, even in Skinner’s view, there are inherited law-like constraints on human
behaviour and therefore humans are not strictly blank slates.
10. N. Chomsky, Review of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, Language 35, 1959,
26–58.
11. J.A. Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, MIT Press, 1983.
12. The exception here is the relatively rare condition of synesthesia, in which the
senses become blended. There is the case of Matthew Blakeslee, who, when he shapes
hamburger patties with his hands, experiences a vivid bitter taste in his mouth.
Esmerelda Jones (a pseudonym) sees blue when she listens to the note C sharp played
on the piano; other notes evoke different hues—so much so that the piano keys are actu-
ally color-coded, making it easier for her to remember and play musical scales. And
when Jeff Coleman looks at printed black numbers, he sees them in color, each a differ-
ent hue. The effect is insulated from their knowledge: the blending persists even when
they are aware of the blending.
13. L. Cosmides and J. Tooby, “Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange,” in J.
Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby, eds., The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology
and the Evolution of Culture, Oxford University Press, 1992; L. Cosmides and J. Tooby,
“Origins of Domain-Specificity: The Evolution of Functional Organization,” in L.
Hirschfeld and S. Gelman, eds., Mapping the Mind: Domain-Specificity in Cognition
and Culture, Cambridge University Press, 1994; J. Tooby and L. Cosmides, “The
Psychological Foundations of Culture,” in Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, The Adapted
Mind; D. Sperber, “The Modularity of Thought and the Epidemiology of
Representations,” in Hirschfeld and Gelman, Mapping the Mind; S. Pinker, How the
Mind Works, Penguin, 1997.
14. S. Carey, Conceptual Change in Childhood, MIT Press, 1985; S. Carey and
E. Spelke, “Domain-Specific Knowledge and Conceptual Change,” in Hirschfeld and
Gelman, Mapping the Mind; E. Spelke, “Initial Knowledge: Six Suggestions,”
Cognition 50 (1995); N. Smith and I. Tsimpli, The Mind of a Savant, Blackwell,
1996; P. Carruthers, “Thinking in Language? Evolution and a Modularist Possibility,”
in P. Carruthers and J. Boucher, eds., Language and Thought, Cambridge University
Press, 1998; L. Hermer-Vazquez, E. Spelke, and A. Katsnelson, “Sources of
Flexibility in Human Cognition: Dual-Task Studies of Space and Language,”
Cognitive Psychology 39 (1999); L. Cosmides and J. Tooby, “Unraveling the Enigma
of Human Intelligence,” in R. Sternberg and J. Kaufman, eds., The Evolution of
Intelligence, Erlbaum, 2001.
15. The equivalent for the scrap heap challenge would be, for example, that the
cumbersome flotation barrels attached to the vehicle cannot be removed for better dry
driving without damaging the strength of the vehicle.
16. Invented by the Psychologist Christopher Tyler, autostereograms are the com-
puter-generated squiggles that when viewed with crossed eyes or a distant gaze suddenly
present three-dimensional objects that seem to leap out of the page.
17. Pardon my descriptions here for their inaccuracy: I hope they are accurate
enough for my point.
18. Work by neurophysiologists has indicated that harmonically inspired music
(classical) and intellectually inspired but highly dissonant music activates different areas
of the human brain: the latter brain regions involved in logico-analytical skills.
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19. I have some reservation here. It is hard to believe that the impact of the Mona
Lisa would be as great if hung upside down. The visual system imposes a reference
frame of top-bottom on the objects of perception in its attempts to recognize them.
20. I would like to thank the historian Vincent Moss, the archaeologist Andrew
Petersen, and the artist Heather Nixon for their critical commentary and discussion.
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